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THE INSTITUTIONALIST IMPLICATIONS 
OF AN ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE 
PAUL B. STEPHAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Sovereigns incur debts, and creditors look to the law to hold sovereigns to 
their obligations. The odious debt doctrine intrudes on this settled pattern when 
(1) a despotic regime incurs a debt (2) for purposes that are inimical to the 
general welfare of the population, and (3) the creditor knows of the loan’s 
illegitimate purpose. The doctrine purports to provide a successor regime with a 
full legal defense to the creditor’s claim for repayment when these three 
requirements are met.1 But this begs the question of its legal status. 
The United States originated the concept of odious debt over a century ago, 
but since World War II, it has regularly upheld the position of creditors in 
negotiations with defaulting sovereign debtors. At present no treaty or 
legislation specifically provides for this defense, and no domestic court in any 
country or any modern arbitral tribunal has embraced it. Yet several prominent 
persons, including at least one Nobel laureate in economics, have endorsed the 
concept, and the doctrine enjoys a certain following among persons who think 
about international debt.2 The regime change in Iraq has whetted interest in the 
issue. 
The status quo, it seems clear, is one where the doctrine does not have any 
“legal effect,” in the sense of modifying the legal relations between debtors and 
creditors. Should the status quo be changed? In legal terms, the question is 
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 1. For a good review of the doctrine, see Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. 
Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007). 
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2003, at 39. For support from political activists, see sources infra note 23. 
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whether to recognize and define an odious debt defense through a treaty or 
national legislative acts, on the one hand, or through the decisions of 
authoritative dispute-settlement bodies, whether international arbitral organs 
or domestic courts. As a matter of convention, the latter route would involve a 
decision by such bodies to treat the doctrine as part of customary international 
law. 
Others may think about the odious debt doctrine as a means to optimize the 
social welfare generated by sovereign-debt contracts. This article also looks at 
social welfare in the economic sense but attacks the problem from a different 
direction. If the doctrine has legal effect only because it is part of customary 
international law, what does its invocation imply about the source of the rules 
that determine the content and enforcement of sovereign debt contracts? Are 
the capabilities of the institutions that develop and apply the doctrine as 
significant as the content of the doctrine itself? Any debate about the doctrine 
must consider the process that produces the doctrine. 
This article concludes that no satisfactory mechanism exists for instituting an 
odious debt doctrine. Granting the authority to void sovereign debts to an 
international organization—the solution favored by several prominent 
commentators—would present severe, and probably insoluble, agency 
problems. The alternative approach of adopting the doctrine as a matter of 
customary international law has even greater difficulties. At the end of the day, 
establishment of the doctrine through the medium of “international law” 
cannot offer a global solution to the problem of despotic debtor regimes and 
conniving creditors. 
Underlying this argument is a larger point. The institutional issue of odious 
debt is a microcosm of the problems posed by customary international law. 
Does the capacity of an authoritative adjudicator with real enforcement power 
to base its decisions, and therefore its disbursement of enforcement resources, 
on claims about international custom present any problems? Who wins and who 
loses when an authoritative adjudicator looks to international custom rather 
than to another source of law? Does the assertion of a capacity to base 
enforcement decisions on international custom augment or diminish welfare? 
By looking at how the odious debt doctrine might work, one may arrive at a 
better understanding of how to think about these questions. 
II 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
It is not hard to offer a doctrinal account of customary international law, but 
this step raises many questions and answers none. According to section 102(2) 
of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of 
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a custom from credible manifestations of official adherence to a practice in 
conditions in which adherence (that is to say, actual compliance, as 
distinguished from formal acceptance) is costly. This conception rests on two 
arguments for limitation, namely (a) that actual state behavior should count for 
something, but that official pronouncements without corresponding action do 
not count at all, and (b) that the best evidence that an actor considers itself 
obliged to behave in a certain way is to see persistent conduct in the face of real 
costs.8 
The invisible college conception rests on two opposing arguments, namely 
(a) that expert opinion provides better evidence of an existing international 
consensus than do the observations of nonexperts (that is, regular judges not 
specially trained in international law) about what nations do, and (b) the 
officially stated aspirations of states matter a great deal, for aspirations provide 
valuable indications of future behavior once norm internalization has occurred.9 
These conceptions, of course, exaggerate the differences among those with an 
opinion about what customary international law is and does. Still, this stylized 
version helps to identify the underlying premises of a debate that has engaged 
much academic attention and judicial resources. 
Some elaboration is necessary. First, the two conceptions need not be seen 
as a proxy for the question whether more or less customary international law is 
desirable. On the one hand, the state-actor construct is not incompatible with a 
robust and extensive body of customary law. Many good reasons exist for states 
to delegate the authority to solve collective-action problems to a third-party 
decisionmaker.10 Eyal Benvenisti, to cite one prominent scholar, argues that at 
least some customary international law represents an efficiency-driven solution 
to such problems. He posits that states recognize in advance that 
straightforward negotiations may fail to produce desirable outcomes, either 
because differences in state interests may thwart recognition of a globally 
desirable result or because domestic interest groups may block one or more 
states from acceding to that outcome. He gives as an example the allocation of 
jurisdiction over waterways that affect multiple states. Faced with obstacles to 
mutually beneficial agreements, Benvenisti argues, the affected states delegate 
to a disinterested and expert third party, such as the International Court of 
 
 8. Thus some commentators have explained the definition of opinio juris as a shorthand for a kind 
of state consent that implies voluntary choice. Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary 
International Law, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 268–93 (1998); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, 
The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 544, 570–71 (2005). 
 9. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004). 
 10. Collective-action problems, generally speaking, are those in which cooperation has a positive 
payoff but individual actors have an incentive to defect from the cooperative norm. For further 
discussion, see Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of 
Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2003); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: 
Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985); Paul B. 
Stephan, Redistributive Litigation—Judicial Innovation, Private Expectations, and the Shadow of 
International Law, 88 VA. L. REV. 789 (2002). 
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Justice, the authority to reach an appropriate outcome. The third-party 
decisionmaker in turn invokes an open-ended conception of customary 
international law, one not depending on the inevitably incomplete set of express 
international agreements, to reach the optimal result.11 
Moreover, if one believes that customary international law results from 
voluntary state choices, it is not too great a stretch to conceive of domestic 
judges as agents with the capacity to make these choices. A court might act as a 
norm entrepreneur, hoping to persuade other jurisdictions to embrace a rule 
that advances some desirable goal, or it might observe the emergence elsewhere 
of a rule with international implications and assume that the political branches 
would prefer to signal cooperation rather than defection (to use the vocabulary 
of game theory). An early and significant decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
made exactly the latter argument to justify adherence to a doctrine of sovereign 
immunity in the absence of a statutory rule.12 It seems clear that, at a minimum, 
domestic courts as well as arbitral tribunals have the capability to act in this 
fashion in cases over which they otherwise have jurisdiction.13 
On the other hand, the invisible-college conception does not necessarily 
lead to many binding rules. The dominant vision of customary international law 
within contemporary academia represents a historically contingent reaction to 
the particular events of the 1970s, rather than a coherent jurisprudential 
position.14 It does not take too great a leap of the imagination to conceive of an 
 
 11. Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a Judicial Tool for Promoting Efficiency, in 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 85 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004). For a sampling of scholarship about 
customary international law that assumes rationalism in the face of collective-action problems, see 
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 5; Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial 
Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631 (2005); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of 
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Norman & Trachtman, supra note 8; Francesco Parisi 
& Vincy Fon, International Customary Law and Articulation Theories: An Economic Analysis, 2 BYU 
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 201 (2006); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002); 
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem 
of Custom, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 839 (2002). 
 12. Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) (holding that a vessel belonging to the 
French navy was not subject to attachment by U.S. courts). 
 13. In limiting this assertion to cases over which courts otherwise have jurisdiction, the statement 
in text takes into account the position that customary international law does not, simply by its status as 
customary international law, constitute federal law for purposes of federal-court jurisdiction under 
Article III of the Constitution or 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the assertion that customary international law is 
federal law in both the constitutional and statutory jurisdictional senses, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 111, 115 (1987); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 219 (1972). For a critical response, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5; A. M. 
Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995). For 
responses to this criticism, see Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International 
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and 
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as 
Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997). 
 14. Paul B. Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and Customary International Law: The Intellectual 
Origins of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
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alternative world in which the academic mainstream might view the persons 
most likely to invoke customary international law, particularly domestic judges, 
as reactionary obstructionists of progressive change. Fearful of development of 
an approach to a customary international law grounded on protection of 
property rights and economic liberty and insensitive to human dignity, scholars 
might come to a consensus that states have not shown a sense of obligation 
about much.15 The point is, again, that one’s conception of how customary 
international law can be constituted is logically independent of one’s 
preferences about its content. 
This article does not address this debate about the constitution of customary 
international law at the level of first principles. Rather, it shows how different 
conceptions of customary international law affect a theoretically rich problem 
of great practical importance—namely, the legal status of the odious debt 
doctrine. There are many good reasons to compel sovereign debtors to honor 
their debt obligations, and other good reasons to relax this compulsion when 
the obligations were assumed by particularly bad regimes for particularly bad 
purposes and a new regime has superseded the original debtors. The question is 
whether bodies with the capacity to coerce sovereign debtors might look to 
customary international law as one of the reasons for staying their hand. How 
these bodies might use customary international law, in turn, reveals something 
about the implications of choices about what to regard as customary 
international law. 
III 
SOVEREIGN-DEBT CONTRACTS 
Debates over the enforceability of sovereign-debt contracts can take place 
in any of several fora. Law is relevant to the extent that an enforcement dispute 
will come to an independent body with the capacity to enforce, or block 
enforcement of, the contract. An arbitral tribunal, perhaps empowered by a 
bilateral investment treaty, might consider whether a failure to pay a debt 
implicates those treaty rights. And creditors might seek enforcement of the debt 
in a domestic court.16 
To be sure, most restructuring of sovereign debt does not involve arbitration 
or litigation. Providers of capital, including international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), other states, and private lenders, can 
assert considerable pressure simply by threatening to withhold future financing. 
 
33 (2003) (linking academy’s support for judicial enforcement of customary international law to 
growing dismay with U.S. foreign policy and policymakers during the 1970s). 
 15. Cf. LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932) (attacking the institution of 
judicial review as a means of resisting liberty-oriented constitutional jurisprudence of the contemporary 
Supreme Court). For articulation of just such a critique of the customary international law of 
investment protection, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(2d ed. 2004). 
 16. For fuller discussion of sovereign debt and its restructuring, see William W. Bratton & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
09__STEPHAN.DOC 12/6/2007  9:04:07 AM 
Summer 2007] THE INSTITUTIONALIST IMPLICATIONS 219 
And what these bodies consider to be the proper limits of debt obligations may 
matter more than what arbitral or judicial bodies think. 
But the distinction between legal rules applied formally by dispute-
resolution bodies, on the one hand, and the considerations that may motivate 
informal dispute settlement, on the other, matters. Institutions can forgive debts 
or withhold future finance for any number of reasons, not only because of 
specified legal criteria. Moreover, they do not have to behave consistently. 
From a functionalist perspective, what distinguishes the work that legal doctrine 
does from that of general policy preferences is the functioning of independent 
dispute-resolution bodies with meaningful enforcement powers.17 This point 
does not mean that legal rules are irrelevant to debtor-credit bargaining. Surely 
these negotiations take place in the shadow of the law. But one should not 
confuse the outcomes of this bargaining with the underlying legal obligation. 
The accommodations made in settlement of a dispute represent at best a very 
noisy signal about what the law requires. 
When a regime borrows on behalf of a state, several legal issues arise. First, 
does the sovereign have the capacity to endow its creditors with conventional 
enforcement rights, including the ability to obtain arbitral awards and judicial 
judgments and to attach the sovereign’s property to obtain satisfaction? Second, 
if the creditors can exercise these rights, can they assert them against later 
regimes that subsequently obtain the authority to act on behalf of the 
sovereign? Third, are there any circumstances under which a debt nominally 
contracted on behalf of a sovereign later can be repudiated? 
The first two questions have affirmative answers, due to the general 
acceptance both of the rules of state succession and of limits on the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. This means that a loan contracted by one regime creates 
legally enforceable rights that, depending on the sovereign’s foreign asset 
holdings and reliance on foreign-source revenues, can result in meaningful 
recourse for creditors. Moreover, a regime change normally does not alter the 
creditors’ rights. Only because of the general principle of successor liability 
does the third question become relevant. 
IV 
THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE 
In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States took the 
position that debts undertaken by Spain but secured with Cuban revenues were 
invalid as to the Cuban security. Spain had used the proceeds from the loan to 
finance the suppression of the Cuban opposition on whose side the United 
States (at least nominally) had fought. The peace treaty that concluded the war 
 
 17. For more on the distinction between formal enforcement of obligations based on rules 
announced ex ante and ex post informal enforcement, see SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note *, at 4, 98–
101. 
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reflected the U.S. position, although Spain never agreed with the U.S. 
arguments. 
Two decades later Chief Justice Taft, presiding over an arbitration between 
Costa Rica and the Royal Bank of Canada, invoked similar arguments to 
relieve Costa Rica from the burden of paying a debt for which a previous 
dictator had contracted. The evidence suggested that the dictator had converted 
the proceeds to his personal use, apparently with the knowledge of the lender. 
Taft ruled that Costa Rica could repudiate the loan.18 
Alexander Sack, an itinerant international-law scholar, then articulated 
what he understood to be a principled version of the U.S. position. According 
to Sack, an indebtedness incurred by a prior regime is “odious” and therefore 
subject to repudiation without recourse if the regime acted without the consent 
of the governed, the debt proceeds did not benefit the subjects of the regime, 
and the creditor had adequate notice of both these facts.19 The Sack formulation 
has come to be the conventional statement of the doctrine. 
But in spite of Sack’s publication of the doctrine, it has played almost no 
role in concrete disputes since then. In 1979 the holder of Chinese imperial 
railroad bonds, issued shortly before the Nationalist revolution, brought a class 
action against the People’s Republic of China (the regime that succeeded the 
Nationalists, who in turn were the successors of the imperial regime that issued 
the bonds) to collect on these debts. The United States had just recognized the 
People’s Republic as the legitimate government of China. Initially China failed 
to appear, and the trial court issued a default judgment against it. China then 
sought to reopen the proceedings, defending its initial nonparticipation as 
reflecting its unfamiliarity with modern legal proceedings and its bad 
experiences with Western imperialism in the past. China also claimed that the 
obligations constituted odious debt because of the quasi-colonial position of the 
Western powers in 1911. The court reopened the proceedings, perhaps 
implicitly giving some weight to the odious debt argument, although its decision 
rested entirely on an interpretation of the doctrine of foreign sovereign 
immunity.20 
Contrast this (at most) glancing reference to the odious debt doctrine with 
the widespread reluctance of new regimes to invoke it. The last thirty years 
have seen the collapse of authoritarian or Soviet-style governments in Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, all encumbered with serious human-rights 
abuses and grave political injustices, yet none of the successor regimes has 
 
 18. Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 375 (1923) [hereinafter Tinoco Arbitration]. 
 19. ALEXANDER SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES 
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES (1927). For recent commentary, see Anna 
Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391 (2005). 
 20. Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986). The precise holding of 
the court—that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s concept of restrictive immunity did not apply to 
claims arising before the Act’s enactment—later was repudiated by the Supreme Court. Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
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sought debt relief on the grounds of its predecessors’ unclean hands.21 One 
might explain this deafening silence as reflecting the doctrine’s nature as a 
power rather than a right. Nothing obliges a new regime to use the doctrine, 
and pragmatic reasons might counsel against doing so. Nonetheless, the failure 
to observe the doctrine at work in the many cases where, by its terms, it could 
have applied is noteworthy. 
If customary international law were merely a product of specific and 
material choices made by responsible official policymakers, then one could 
comfortably conclude that the odious debt doctrine has not become part of that 
body of unwritten but binding international obligations. Aside from a recent 
unilateral decision by the government of Norway, in its capacity as creditor, to 
attribute an act of debt forgiveness to the doctrine, no contemporary official 
support exists.22 Sovereign debtors in particular have not sought its shelter. But 
unofficial actors are not so easily discouraged, and one still encounters a claim 
that the doctrine functions as a norm of customary international law. During the 
1990s, supporters of developing countries’ efforts to rid themselves of their 
inherited debt burden revived the concept and suggested that both international 
organs, including non-judicial bodies such as the IMF, and national courts ought 
to invoke the odious debt doctrine to relieve sovereign debtors.23 
For the odious debt concept to be anything more than a talking point in a 
negotiation, some body with formal enforcement authority would have to 
decide to apply customary international law to a dispute between a sovereign 
debtor and its creditors. Because debts invariably rest on a local law of contract, 
the adjudicator would have to choose between recognizing a customary rule and 
applying national law. As a matter of industry practice, most formal sovereign-
debt contracts contain choice-of-law provisions that direct the adjudicator to 
use either English or New York law. But even in disputes governed by an 
express choice of law, an English or New York court might decide that its law 
comprises certain rules of customary international law. 
Consider the dispute that became the leading Supreme Court case of Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.24 Cuba asserted its right to collect money owed 
under a contract of sale for sugar. Sabbatino, the receiver for a U.S.-owned 
 
 21. See Joseph Hanlon, Defining “Illegitimate Debt”: When Creditors Should Be Liable for 
Improper Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS: CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS FOR 
RESOLVING THE THIRD WORLD DEBT CRISIS 109 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006). 
 22. Krishna Guha, Norway Debt Cancellation Hailed by Activists, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006,  at 43. 
The loans involved ships built by Norwegian firms, and a skeptic might interpret Norway’s debt 
forgiveness as a price rebate in a tight market. 
 23. E.g., SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 21; PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS 
DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 
(1991); Soren Ambrose, Social Movements and the Politics of Debt Cancellation, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 267 
(2005); Kevin H. Anderson, International Law and State Succession: A Solution to the Iraqi Debt Crisis? 
2 UTAH L. REV. 401 (2005); David D. Caron, The Reconstruction of Iraq: Dealing with Debt, 11 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 123 (2004); Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923 
(2004); Detlev F. Vagts, Sovereign Bankruptcy: In re Germany (1953), In re Iraq (2004), 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 302 (2004). 
 24. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
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Cuban entity that had owned the sugar before the Castro regime had 
expropriated it, argued that he had the superior claim to the money. The 
Second Circuit, applying New York law, ascertained that New York would 
invoke a customary-international-law doctrine invalidating expropriations that 
were motivated by a retaliatory rather than a public purpose, that were 
discriminatory in effect, or that provided inadequate compensation.25 In 
reversing that decision, the Supreme Court did not question the general 
capacity of New York courts to select rules of decision from customary 
international law. It determined, however, that the particular context, involving 
the validity of an official act of a sovereign executed within its territory, 
required application of federal common law that displaced state law. The Court 
then concluded that this federal common law, unlike New York law, would not 
look to customary international law.26 
In the minds of many authorities today, Sabbatino stands for the proposition 
that courts have the authority to create federal common law in areas dominated 
by foreign relations concerns.27 What the Court believed it was doing, however, 
was imposing a constraint on the otherwise broad power of state courts to apply 
customary international law, as they understood it, to cases otherwise within 
their jurisdiction. When it is not displaced by federal law, the choice to invoke 
customary international law, which implies a power to determine its content, in 
turn is binding on a federal court to the extent that it must look to a state’s law 
for a rule of decision in a case over which it has jurisdiction.28 Thus the law of 
 
 25. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 26. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424–37. Within months, Congress repudiated Sabbatino’s holding by 
directing federal courts to consider whether an expropriation of property by a foreign sovereign 
violated customary international law regardless of the official nature of the expropriation: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline on the 
ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect 
to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to 
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such 
state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by 
an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law, including the principles of 
compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection: Provided, That this 
subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not 
contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right to property 
acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued 
in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with 
respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is 
required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a 
suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court. 
Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d), 78 Stat. 1013, amending Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, codified at 22 U.S.C.S. § 2370(e)(2) (2001). 
 27. For a review and critique of this position, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5. For the 
Supreme Court’s recent endorsement (in dicta) of the power of federal courts to develop a federal 
common law of foreign relations, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–20 (2004). For the 
argument that Sosa confirms the point that federal courts lack a general power to recognize customary 
international law absent a statutory directive to do so, see Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & 
David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 869 (2007). 
 28. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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New York continues to hold that expropriations that are lacking in a public 
purpose, are discriminatory, or are without adequate compensation are invalid, 
except when federal law overrides this rule. 
Absent application of the Sabbatino override, then, New York courts (and 
presumably British ones as well) have the power to invoke international custom 
and conceivably might do so with respect to the odious debt doctrine.29 But, as 
noted above, the possession of a power does not imply the need to exercise it. 
The question remains whether state courts, federal courts applying state law, or 
an arbitral tribunal should recognize the odious debt doctrine as a means of 
facilitating sovereign-debtor repudiation of unwelcome obligations. This inquiry 
in turn requires a determination of the available alternatives. 
Presumably, an adjudicator would consider the background of national rules 
that might apply to a creditor’s claim. Most contracts for sovereign debt, 
whether bank loans or bonds, reflect the work of sophisticated counsel and are 
unlikely expressly to bar enforcement. A waiver of sovereign immunity and the 
act-of-state doctrine, as well as choice-of-forum and -of-law clauses, almost 
always appears. But some elements of the odious debt doctrine have 
counterparts in national law, in the sense that both justify the nonenforcement 
of the obligation in spite of the contractual commitment. 
First, a debtor can argue that, under its domestic legal order, the persons 
who contracted for the debt lacked the legal authority to do so.30 This ultra vires 
defense corresponds to Taft’s determination in the Tinoco arbitration that the 
Costa Rican dictator borrowed for his own benefit and violated various local 
laws to do so. A similar argument was raised but rejected in Sabbatino, namely 
that the Castro government’s expropriation decree violated Cuban law because 
of procedural irregularities.31 
Second, a creditor that colludes with a regime’s agents in concealing the 
circumstances of a transaction, such as by paying a bribe to place a loan, 
presumably has committed fraud, for which rescission is a conventional remedy. 
One may assume that the common-law doctrine of fraud can reach many abuses 
that coincide with the conventional understanding of odious debt. Corruption 
and secrecy, if proved, might render many loan contracts voidable, if not void. 
 
 29. I will not discuss here the applicability to sovereign-debt contracts of the act-of-state doctrine 
articulated in Sabbatino, although in some cases it may be relevant. U.S. courts generally have regarded 
the act-of-state doctrine to be inapplicable to loans payable outside the territory of the debtor 
sovereign. Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). There remains, however, some conceptual tension between the 
odious debt doctrine, which calls on adjudicators to sanction illiberal states, and the act-of-state 
doctrine, which insulates the official acts of illiberal states from conventional choice-of-law review by 
foreign courts. See Anne-Marie [Slaughter] Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism 
and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992). 
 30. State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995) (basing judgment against broker 
on state customer’s legal incapacity); Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, 2 
W.L.R. 372 (H.L. 1991) (holding debt contract unenforceable because Borough Council lacked legal 
capacity to enter into it). 
 31. 376 U.S. at 415 n.17. 
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What existing national law does not do, however, is rescind a contract when 
the loan contract was unwise, or the use of the loan proceeds foolish or even 
immoral, in the absence of a national law forbidding the borrowing authority 
from undertaking the transaction. If most despots bother to enact domestic laws 
that allow them to incur debts under conditions that please them, and if most 
creditors do not pay bribes or engage in other conduct that might be 
characterized as fraud, then national law at its current state of development 
would limit the capacity of new regimes to repudiate the debts of their odious 
predecessors. 
V 
THE CASE FOR RECOGNIZING AN ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE 
Should adjudicators supplement national law with the odious debt doctrine? 
One might start with a first-order analysis. Under what conditions would 
creditors and sovereign debtors overall prefer legal rules that reward nonodious 
regimes and isolate bad actors, which is to say both bad regimes and the lenders 
who knowingly connive with them to finance bad projects? 
The policy case for recognizing an odious debt doctrine rests on the 
assertion that a rule making avoidable loans to bad regimes to do bad things 
would generate a separating equilibrium that might enhance overall welfare. No 
individual creditor or sovereign debtor, however, has an incentive to create 
these rules. The problem is not good regimes, which probably would welcome a 
contractual clause warranting their lack of odiousness and giving the creditor 
remedies if loan proceeds were used for odious purposes.  But potentially 
odious regimes and their creditors have no motivation to embrace such a 
clause.32 Nor is unilateral leadership by a single jurisdiction likely to work. If one 
important jurisdiction—New York or London—took the lead in adopting an 
odious debt rule, bad regimes seeking to finance bad projects would take their 
business to the other jurisdiction. Even if New York and London tried to 
collaborate in adopting a rule together, each would fear that the other would 
chisel on enforcement to attract more business from bad regimes. 
In other words, a collective-action problem exists. As long as odiousness vel 
non remains an insufficient ground for invalidating a sovereign’s contract, 
creditors cannot reward nonodious regimes. If creation of a separating 
equilibrium were desirable, then some generally applicable mechanism to 
invalidate contracts with bad regimes for bad purposes might benefit all 
creditors and most sovereign borrowers. There are, of course, countervailing 
 
 32. The core problem is that bad behavior by the debtor is an externality that cannot be captured 
by contract. The odious debt doctrine imposes a sanction that falls on the creditor. Bad regimes have no 
incentive to inflict this sanction on creditors (who will charge them for the ex ante risk), and good 
regimes have no mechanism for rewarding their creditors. Proposals to institute the odious debt 
doctrine through contract fail to account for the externality. E.g., Adam Feibelman, Equitable 
Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 
Autumn 2007). 
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arguments, but for present purposes, consider the hypothetical position that 
there exists some version of the odious debt doctrine that would generate 
benefits that could exceed its costs. But how can this be achieved?33 
An initial objection to a freestanding odious debt doctrine is that odiousness 
is in the eye of the beholder and thus not truly verifiable. Here, the term 
“verifiable” means to incorporate the teaching of the economics of information, 
which distinguishes among private information (information that cannot be 
credibly conveyed to third parties, such as a state of mind or future intentions), 
observable information (information that persons in an ongoing relationship 
can observe, such as quality of performance, but cannot prove to a disinterested 
third party at an acceptable cost), and verifiable information (information that 
can be verified by a disinterested third party at an acceptable cost). Within this 
framework, only verifiable terms are contractible, for legal obligations subject 
to third-party enforcement must rest on verifiable conditions. A comprehensive 
definition of regime and project “badness” might run the risk of not being 
ascertainable by a disinterested third party, given the many ways that people 
might regard governments or projects as inadequate. 
As Robert Scott and George Triantis have demonstrated, the law has 
developed tools for working around this problem. The principal solution is the 
use of a verifiable proxy for an unverifiable condition. The proxy might take the 
form of a rule that imperfectly captures the condition (think of “over fifty-five 
miles an hour” as a proxy for “unreasonably fast”) or of an allocation of the 
burden of proof to the person seeking to prove the condition. Proxies are costly, 
for either an overinclusive or an underinclusive rule will depart from the 
optimal but unverifiable condition. But in many circumstances the assumption 
of these costs is an acceptable alternative to treating the condition as 
noncontractible.34 
For purposes of discussion, assume that a regime would qualify as odious 
only if it both completely lacked democratic accountability due to suppression 
of all forms of dissent and systematically engaged in extrajudicial violence 
against its citizens. The debts of such a regime would be odious only if the 
lender could be charged with the knowledge that the loan proceeds would be 
used directly and exclusively to carry out repression. For purposes of discussion, 
in other words, one can assume that there may exist conditions that are 
sufficiently stringent to make them susceptible to objective proof. Let us also 
stipulate that successor regimes would bear the burden of proving both that 
their predecessor met this test and that creditors knew that the loans they made 
met it. 
 
 33. For the argument, institutional issues aside, that an odious debt doctrine is unlikely to enhance 
welfare, see Albert H. Choi & Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Summer 2007). 
 34. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 814 (2006). 
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Some, especially those who see the odious debt doctrine as a means to 
launch a broad critique of global capitalism, might find this definition too 
confining. Among other things, it rejects the argument that money is fungible 
and that any capital acquired by an odious regime functionally serves its odious 
purposes. What this definition does, however, is identify those circumstances 
under which regimes are most likely to divert government resources that 
otherwise might benefit the general population. The objective is distinguishing 
between indisputably bad regimes that have no evident incentive to act on 
behalf of the governed and the more quotidian human-rights-abusing state (the 
latter class comprising, in the view of some scholars and nongovernmental 
organizations, the United States, Japan, and most, if not all, members of the 
European Union). 
Were creditors to become persuaded that this standard would apply, they 
presumably would build an “odiousness” risk into the price of loans to 
sovereigns. The cost of finance would increase for bad regimes contemplating 
bad projects. Presumably, longer-term credit would reflect this risk more than 
shorter-term, for the risk of a new regime taking over from the current 
borrower would increase over time.35 This interest surcharge would function as a 
tax on regimes likely to be declared odious at some later date. Although such a 
tax would not replace other sanctions (as the invasion of Iraq suggests), it would 
provide some disincentive to regimes inclined toward odiousness. Thus far, the 
welfare case for the doctrine seems strong. 
VI 
THE INSTITUTIONALIST IMPLICATIONS 
But what of second-order effects? How would jurisdictions overcome the 
collective-action problem posed by the present nonrecognition of the odious 
debt doctrine, and what implications would these strategies have for the legal 
system generally? For ease of analysis, two different approaches are considered 
here, one involving top-down state coordination and the other involving 
bottom-up doctrinal innovation by courts invoking customary international law. 
A. Top-Down Approach 
Imagine an international institution with the capacity to label regimes and 
projects as odious and successors as nonodious. To complete the picture, 
suppose an international treaty pursuant to which states commit to honor the 
determinations of that body by requiring their courts not to enforce the 
contractual debts of odious regimes. Some theorists, including Nobel laureate 
 
 35. The statement in text assumes that odious regimes cannot invoke the doctrine to discharge 
their debts. As noted below, under certain assumptions this actually becomes an undesirable restriction. 
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Joseph Stiglitz, argue that this mechanism would provide an ideal solution to 
the problem of odious debt.36 
Lest such a proposal seem visionary, recall that some elements of this treaty 
regime already exist. The United Nations Security Council has the authority 
under the U.N. Charter to impose economic sanctions on regimes that threaten 
international order through their abuse of their subjects. It thus could call on all 
member states to refuse to recognize debts contracted by such regimes 
whenever a lender might be charged with knowledge of the odious use of the 
loan proceeds. All that is missing is a mechanism to convert Security Council 
resolutions into binding law of the sort that directly invalidates debt contracts. 
Although the Charter obligates U.N. members to carry out Security Council 
resolutions, it does not provide for direct effect of those resolutions in the 
members’ domestic legal order. National governments may cite a Security 
Council resolution as a basis for adopting a domestic law, but a refusal to carry 
out a resolution may result only in another resolution.37 
One might overlook this chink in the Security Council’s armor. What 
remains interesting is that no proponent of the odious debt doctrine has seen 
the Security Council as the proper institutional mechanism for implementing 
the doctrine. The Security Council can act only with the consent of the five 
great powers, and rarely do they reach a consensus on what constitutes an 
odious regime or an objectionable use of loan proceeds. If odious debt were left 
only to this body, then, it would have little practical significance. In the case of 
Iraq, the Security Council sanctions that were adopted did not bar the Ba’athist 
regime from undertaking a wide array of contractual commitments (putting 
aside for the moment the administration of the sanctions, which may have 
engendered some fraud and corruption, and thus some defenses against 
collection under national law). 
But how would one go about designing an international mechanism with a 
quicker trigger, that is, a greater propensity to characterize regimes as odious? 
Unless stringent criteria are used, along the lines described above, severe 
agency problems would result. The agency wielding this authority would find 
itself mired in ideological wars about what counts as a truly democratic and 
representative government and how governments must serve the public good. 
Other issues, such as the treatment of ethnic minorities or the production of 
greenhouse gases, also could demand attention. The agency also would struggle 
 
 36. Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 2; Stiglitz, supra note 2. As a substantive matter, this 
solution departs from the conventional description of the doctrine by making debts contracted by 
odious regimes unenforceable, even in the absence of a succession. This extension is necessary to make 
bad regimes fully internalize the cost of their misconduct. 
 37. For an instance of grounding “national” law (here an EC Council Regulation) on a mandate 
received from the Security Council, see Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-03649 
(upholding freeze of assets as part of antiterror program in response to Security Council Resolution 
1333). For a refusal by the German Constitutional Court to regard a Security Council resolution as a 
sufficient basis for a national law implementing an E.U. framework decision, see Re Constitutionality of 
German Law Implementing the Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant (2 BvR 2236/04), 
[2006] 1 C.M.L.R. 16. 
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to determine the specific purposes of particular debts against the background of 
money’s fungibility. Finally, the criteria for determining whether a creditor 
should be charged with knowledge of the regime and the project’s odious 
character could be strict or loose. Under conditions of unstable and evolving 
geopolitics, the capacity of the agency to develop conceptions of odiousness 
that diverge from initial conceptions would grow over time.38 
These problems would be compounded if an institution with other functions 
received the authority to label debts as odious. A general concern is that 
bureaucracies, international as much as domestic, seek to maximize their 
discretionary power. Given this tendency, an agency would be expected to use 
its power to declare odiousness for its own ends, rather than to fine-tune the 
conception of what constitutes a bad regime. 
In earlier work I raised this concern with respect to the IMF.39 That body 
often finds itself supervising the restructuring of sovereign debt. One stopgap 
tool that a sovereign engaged in restructuring may employ is the issuance of 
exchange regulations that limit the export of foreign currency. At least one U.S. 
court has ruled that the question whether a state’s exchange controls impose an 
expropriation in violation of customary international law, or instead constitute a 
lawful act of regulation that a foreign court must respect, turns on whether the 
IMF has approved of the controls.40 Recognition of this power in turn 
strengthens the IMF’s hand in its negotiations with debtor states. Some 
evidence suggests that the IMF uses this power principally to further the goals 
of private creditors, the likely future employers of current IMF staff.41 
On balance, then, it seems unlikely that any international agency would gain 
the power to declare regimes or projects odious on any broader terms and 
subject to any lower procedural hurdles than those applicable to the Security 
Council. The great powers, and the United Kingdom and the United States in 
particular, are not likely to surrender their capacity to veto these declarations, 
and giving the declaratory authority to an international agency with its own 
agenda presents additional difficulties that would further diminish the 
likelihood of their consent.42 What are the alternatives? Can other bodies, 
particularly arbitral tribunals and domestic courts, respond to the collective-
 
 38. See generally Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification—The Agency Problem, 
3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333 (2002). 
 39. Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681, 692–93 (1996–97). 
 40. West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987), 482 U.S. 906 (1987). 
 41. Erica R. Gould, Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund 
Conditionality, 57 INT’L ORG. 551 (2003). 
 42. Note that a comparable situation is presented by the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
which exercises the power otherwise held by the Security Council to decide when to prosecute criminal 
violations of international law. Paul Stephan, U.S. Constitutionalism and International Law: What the 
Multilateralist Move Leaves Out, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 11 (2004). As of this writing, a majority of the 
great powers, and four other states that possess nuclear weapons, have refused to accede to the treaty 
establishing the ICC. 
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action problem with a welfare-enhancing solution that, by virtue of its declared 
status as customary international law, binds all relevant actors? 
B. Bottom-Up Approach 
If a top-down approach to odious debts seems impracticable, then perhaps a 
bottom-up strategy might recommend itself. Hypothetically, the odious debt 
doctrine could become part of customary international law if an authoritative 
tribunal were to declare it so. Of course, the tribunal would not admit to such a 
bold exercise of power. Rather, it would “find” the doctrine within customary 
international law by noting the weight of authoritative opinion declaring that 
the doctrine had become an international rule and position itself as following 
this authority. Once one tribunal makes this move, it could create pressure on 
others to do the same. Thus New York might follow London, or London New 
York, because of a common acceptance of the obligation to apply customary 
international law, an obligation that is stronger than the duty to follow the 
national law of other states. 
Several objections immediately present themselves. Even if one were to 
concede a general obligation to apply customary international law, why would 
one tribunal accept another’s version? In Benvenisti’s example, the disputants 
have agreed on a single forum. This move solves the problem of coordinating 
among different versions of customary law. But absent such coordination, what 
chance is there of any one version’s dominating the others? If there exists a risk 
that New York and London might chisel when applying nominally identical 
national legal standards, is there not a similar risk with regard to the application 
of a common international custom? 
But resting the odious debt doctrine on customary international law 
presents an even deeper problem than the possibility of divergent 
interpretations. Whatever the desirability of the odious debt rule in the abstract, 
it remains true that the doctrine has played no significant role in the last eighty 
years, a time of great regime changes and adjustments in sovereign debt. 
Invoking the doctrine now would unambiguously count as a surprise. Yet for it 
to have any effect in a judicial or arbitral proceeding, it must apply ex post. The 
ex ante effects of a rule applied ex post necessarily include legal instability. 
Judicial or arbitral adoption of a surprising new rule, in the context of the 
international sovereign debt market, presents two kinds of instability problems. 
First, the introduction of new, unanticipated terms into long-established and 
widely used contracts increases legal risk generally. Tribunals will have 
difficulty reassuring contractors that an odious debt decision is a one-off matter, 
and not part of a general skepticism about the enforceability of sovereign debt 
contracts. Second, finding an acceptable proxy for odiousness would be no 
easier for courts than for an international agency. 
As many have noted, claims about the content of customary international 
law, especially regarding the human rights that individuals enjoy against states, 
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have exploded in the last quarter century.43 Because these claims rest largely on 
the views of politically insulated expert jurists rather than of politically 
accountable governments or legislatures, the centrifugal pressure to expand 
customary international law’s domain (and thus of the experts) is great, and the 
centripetal pressures are essentially nonexistent. A judge seeking to consult the 
invisible college about the content of human-rights law to determine what 
qualifies as odious would find a wealth of opinion but no clear and determinant 
core. 
The indeterminate nature of customary international law is not just a 
general problem, but one that affects the odious debt doctrine specifically. One 
can find, for example, reputable authorities that regard repression and murder 
as sufficient, but by no means necessary, to label a regime as odious. These 
commentators also appear to regard any loan made to such a regime as at least 
presumptively odious, no matter what the nominal project.44 Many of the 
current proponents of the doctrine make arguments that echo those of the New 
International Economic Order of the 1970s, which challenged the capacity of 
postcolonial regimes ever to enter into binding commitments with powerful 
institutions of the developed world.45 Experts question the economic choices of 
any regime, especially in the developing world, that fails to address 
environmental concerns, the interests of indigenous peoples, or the rights of 
workers. If odiousness is determined in light of these views, then much of 
sovereign borrowing, both past and future, carries enforcement risk. Yet 
expanding the scope of odiousness—a process that seems inevitable if 
customary international law is to do the work—erodes the supposed benefits of 
a separating equilibrium that the doctrine hypothetically would create. 
The central problem is that once a court puts customary international law in 
play, it is difficult to find a midpoint between the divergent positions that the 
state-actor and invisible-college conceptions indicate. By focusing on 
authoritative official actions that entail real costs, a decisionmaker might 
conclude that only regimes and uses subject to Security Council sanctions count 
as odious. By focusing on the positions of publicists, a decisionmaker might find 
fault with many regimes past and present and all or most of their borrowing. 
The first outcome may seem too stringent, while the latter opens up too many 
 
 43. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 839–40. 
 44. E.g., Chris Jochnick, The Legal Case for Debt Repudiation, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 21, at 133, 147. 
 45. See A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1945–1975 (2 vols.) 
(Alfred George Moss & Harry N.M. Winton eds., 1977); THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1977); OSWALDO DE RIVERO B., 
NEW ECONOMIC ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW (1980); THE CHALLENGE OF 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Edwin P. Reubens ed., 1981); FOREIGN TRADE IN 
THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Detlev Chr. Dicke & Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann eds., 1988); Seymour J. Rubin, Economic and Social Human Rights and the New 
International Economic Order, 1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 67 (1986); Burns H. Weston, The Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 437 (1981). 
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possibilities. Yet the optimal midpoint lacks support in either conception. Many 
murderous and repressive regimes have not faced Security Council sanctions. 
And many flawed, but not truly appalling, regimes have been excoriated by the 
invisible college. Debates about what kinds of projects further the general 
welfare are equally open-ended. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Several conclusions result from this analysis. First, legislators hypothetically 
could adopt ex ante rules to guide future sovereign debtors. For example, either 
the United States or the United Kingdom reasonably might amend its statutory 
law of sovereign immunity to block enforcement of sovereign-debt obligations 
in cases that satisfy a narrow and clear definition of odiousness. A precedent of 
sorts (as a mirror) exists in the 1996 amendment to the U.S. Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, which lifted immunity for certain acts of terrorism and other 
gross human-rights abuses.46 States might extend immunity to debts incurred by 
prior regimes that engage in comparable misconduct. The sanctions regime of 
Title III of the Helms–Burton legislation, which provides a cause of action 
against persons who “traffick” in property seized by the Cuban government as 
part of its revolution but also eliminates this action once the U.S. president 
determines that Cuba has enjoyed a democratic restoration, also provides a 
model for this hypothetical legislation.47 The adoption of such rules, of course, 
would have no bearing on the Iraqi debt, absent a constitutionally dubious 
attempt to apply such legislation retroactively. Moreover, that models exist does 
not mean that adoption of such a statute, or perhaps the negotiation of a U.K.–
U.S. treaty that did the same kind of work, is desirable. The difficulties—in 
particular, agency issues and potential chiseling—remain. 
Second, judicial efforts to achieve this outcome in advance of any legislation 
present substantial drawbacks. They could increase the cost of transition away 
from authoritarian and repression regimes, for successors regimes would have 
difficulty credibly committing either to the honoring of past obligations or to 
not backsliding on their own human-rights obligations. A general rise in the cost 
of credit to developing-country sovereigns seems a more likely outcome than 
either the establishment of a separating equilibrium between good and bad 
regimes or increased pressure on lenders not to prop up dictators. 
Ultimately, the odious debt issue illustrates the limits of what international 
law can do. Not all collective-action problems are soluble through formal legal 
intervention at an acceptable cost. The bottom-up, case-by-case, fact-specific 
methodology that customary international law employs is a particularly 
 
 46. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 221(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). 
 47. Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, § 302(h)(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 104-
114, 110 Stat. 788 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6082(h)(1)(B)). 
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unsatisfactory way of attacking this problem. Recognition that international law 
does not always supply a solution should not be mistaken for a rejection of its 
function or value. There are other ways to attack bad regimes that do bad things 
and those who underwrite their misdeeds. For example, the spread over the last 
decade of anticorruption regimes, which motivate competition among states to 
prosecute each other’s multinational companies for inducing governments to 
disregard the public interest, points to one promising approach. But undoing 
the bounds of contract is not the answer. 
